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“NATURAL BORN” DISPUTES IN THE 2016 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Derek T. Muller* 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2016 presidential election brought forth new disputes concerning the 
definition of “natural born Citizen.”1  The most significant challenges 
surrounded the eligibility of Senator Ted Cruz,2 born in Canada to a Cuban 
father and an American mother.3  Unlike challenges to President Barack 
Obama’s eligibility, which largely turned on conspiratorial facts, challenges 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  Special thanks to 
Jerry Goldfeder and the Fordham Law Review for organizing this important discussion 
concerning election law arising out of the 2016 presidential election.  Derek O’Reilly-Jones 
provided invaluable research assistance.  This Article is part of a forum entitled Election 
Law and the Presidency held at Fordham University School of Law. 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 2. See Green v. Cruz, No. 5:16-cv-00207-HGD (N.D. Ala. May 10, 2016); Schwartz v. 
Cruz, No. H-16-106, 2016 WL 1449251, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-
20231 (5th Cir. June 21, 2016) (per curiam); Fischer v. Cruz, No. 16-CV-1224(JS)(ARL), 
2016 WL 1383493, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2016); Wagner v. Cruz, No. 2:16-cv-55-JNP (D. 
Utah Mar. 18, 2016), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2395 (2016); Librace v. Martin, No. 4:16-cv-
00057-BSM (E.D. Ark. Feb. 29, 2016); Voeltz v. Cruz, No. 15-022044(02) (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Mar. 14, 2016); Smallwood v. State, No. SCEC-16-0000330 (Haw. Apr. 21, 2016); Korman 
v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 522647 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 2016), appeal denied, 
No. 2016-374 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 2016); Elliot v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), 
aff’d, 134 A.3d 51 (Pa. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-13, 2016 WL 3570607 (U.S. Oct. 3, 
2016); Joyce v. Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 526 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham v. 
Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 527 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham v. Rubio, 16 
SOEB GP 528 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Elliot v. Cruz, BLC 2015-2 (N.H. 
Ballot Law Comm’n 2015); Laity v. Cruz, BLC 2015-4 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015); 
Williams v. Cruz (Williams II), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16 (N.J. Office of 
Admin. Law Apr. 13, 2016); Tony Cook, Cruz, Rubio Presidential Candidacies Face 
Citizenship Challenges in Indiana, INDYSTAR (Feb. 19, 2016), http:// 
www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2016/02/18/cruz-rubio-presidential-candidacies-face-
citizenship-challenges-indiana/80560572/ [https://perma.cc/4876-43DL]; see also Derek T. 
Muller, Status of Pending “Natural Born Citizen” Challenges and Litigation in 2016 
Presidential Election, EXCESS DEMOCRACY, http://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2016/2/ 
status-of-pending-natural-born-citizen-challenges-and-litigation-in-2016-presidential-
election (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5C36-F5D6]. 
 3. While this Article focuses on these disputes, challenges concerning other candidates 
did exist.  Some challenges attacked Marco Rubio’s eligibility—he was born in the United 
States to Cuban immigrant parents. See, e.g., Laity, BLC 2015-4.  Additionally, challenges 
concerning Rick Santorum (son of an Italian immigrant) and Bobby Jindal (son of Indian 
immigrants) were also filed but abandoned early. See Email from Robert Laity to Joseph 
Foster, Att’y Gen., State of N.H. (Nov. 13, 2015, 5:17 AM), http://sos.nh.gov/WorkArea/ 
DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589951073 [https://perma.cc/X5LJ-ZWB5]. 
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to Cruz’s eligibility turned principally on the law and garnered more serious 
attention concerning a somewhat cryptic constitutional clause.  
Understandably, much attention focused on the definition of “natural born 
citizen” and whether candidates like Cruz qualified.4  Administrative 
challenges and litigation in court revealed deficiencies in the procedures for 
handling such disputes.  This paper exhaustively examines these challenges, 
identifies three significant complications arising out of these disputes, and 
urges a solution for future presidential elections. 
Accordingly, Part I of this Article briefly discusses the history of natural 
born citizen litigation.  Part II then highlights how agencies tasked with 
administering elections and reviewing challenges to candidate eligibility 
often construed their own jurisdiction broadly.  But good reasons exist for 
construing such jurisdiction narrowly—after all, voters, political parties, the 
Electoral College, and Congress all may scrutinize whether a candidate is a 
natural born citizen, and unless the legislature has expressly spoken 
otherwise, these agencies should defer to others before deciding whether to 
keep a candidate off the ballot. 
Part III examines how, although litigation in federal court usually led to 
swift dismissal on a procedural ground, challenges in state proceedings 
sometimes led to broad—and incorrect—pronouncements about the power 
to scrutinize the eligibility of presidential candidates.  A state court in 
Pennsylvania and the New Jersey Secretary of State each erroneously held 
that neither the Electoral College nor Congress has the power to review the 
qualifications of candidates.5  While state legislatures may well have 
empowered a state court or an elections official to review qualifications, it 
is not because of an absence of other capable bodies to do so.  Compressed 
timeframes to file briefs and inadequately prepared decision makers led to 
sloppy findings that linger as precedent for future litigation. 
Part IV discusses how decision makers repeatedly mused about how 
useful it would be if the U.S. Supreme Court offered a clear definition of 
“natural born citizen.”  Some reached the outright conclusion that Cruz was 
qualified for office.  Others found that he was not so obviously unqualified 
 
 4. See, e.g., Paul Clement & Neal Katyal, On the Meaning of “Natural Born Citizen,” 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 161 (2015); Michael D. Ramsey, The Original Meaning of “Natural 
Born” (Jan. 7, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2712485 [https://perma.cc/7YPS-FTGC]; Akhil Reed Amar, Why 
Ted Cruz Is Eligible to Be President, CNN (Jan. 14, 2016, 11:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2016/01/13/opinions/amar-cruz-trump-natural-born-citizen/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y5 
EG-JYSF]; Bryan A. Garner, Memorandum:  Is Ted Cruz Eligible for the Presidency?, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/01/ted-cruz-
eligibility-memo/424206/ [https://perma.cc/9MVP-3244]; Thomas Lee, Is Ted Cruz a 
‘Natural Born Citizen’?:  Not If You’re a Constitutional Originalist, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 
2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-lee-is-ted-cruz-eligible-to-be-
president-20160110-story.html [https://perma.cc/9MUR-B9YK]; Rob Natelson, Claims That 
Senator Cruz Is Not “Natural Born” Need to Be Taken Seriously, ORIGINALISM BLOG (Jan. 
11, 2016, 11:45 PM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2016/01/ 
claims-that-sen-cruz-is-not-natural-born-need-to-be-taken-seriouslyrob-natelson.html 
[https://perma.cc/M5V5-P49A]. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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as to keep his name off the ballot.  Repeatedly, however, they expected a 
final judicial pronouncement from the highest court to resolve the matter 
rather than leaving the matter to the voters, Electoral College, or Congress.  
This suggests that executive and state judicial actors are uncomfortable with 
nonfederal judicial resolution of a constitutional claim like this one. 
Finally, Part V offers a small recommendation.  After three consecutive 
presidential election cycles with time-consuming and costly litigation, it 
may well be time to amend the Constitution and abolish the natural born 
citizen requirement.  Although no court has excluded any major party 
candidate from the ballot on such grounds yet, the procedural wrangling 
and political uncertainty surrounding the issue may counsel in favor of a 
simpler, easy-to-administer standard for future candidates.  Amending the 
Constitution is admittedly no simple task.  But perhaps an uncontroversial 
amendment would find broad support in order to avoid delays and legal 
challenges seen in recent presidential primaries and elections. 
I.  HISTORY OF “NATURAL BORN CITIZEN” LITIGATION 
AND TRADITIONAL MECHANISMS FOR OVERSEEING 
A CANDIDATE’S ELIGIBILITY 
Disputes over presidential qualifications are hardly of recent vintage,6 but 
voluminous and serious litigation over such disputes is assuredly new.  The 
proliferation of litigation surrounding Barack Obama (born in Hawaii to a 
Kenyan father and raised for some years in Indonesia) and John McCain 
(born in the United States-controlled Panama Canal Zone) was 
unprecedented.7  The bulk of the litigation surrounded conspiracy theories 
regarding Obama, often allegations that he was actually born in Kenya or 
Indonesia, which meant he was not a natural born citizen8 and therefore not 
qualified to serve as President of the United States.9  Most challenges were 
raised in courts, often by individuals who lacked standing to bring such 
claims in the first place.10  Because most claims were thrown out on 
procedural or jurisdictional grounds, almost no tribunal actually weighed in 
on the definition of “natural born citizen.”11 
But courts are not the only place where such claims could be addressed.  
I have previously argued that there are several bodies that have the ability to 
scrutinize a presidential candidate’s eligibility.12  Consider the many actors 
with political (and legal) opportunities to review the qualifications of 
presidential candidates:  primary voters; political parties and convention 
 
 6. See, e.g., Jill A. Pryor, Note, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential 
Eligibility:  An Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 
881, 882 n.6 (1988). 
 7. See Derek T. Muller, Scrutinizing Federal Electoral Qualifications, 90 IND. L.J. 559, 
576 (2015). 
 8. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 9. See generally Muller, supra note 7, at 576 & nn.134–36. 
 10. See id. at 576–77 & nn.132–41. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See generally id. 
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delegates; general-election voters; presidential electors; and, last but not 
least, Congress. 
A.  Primary Voters 
The presidential primaries include robust opportunities to debate whether 
candidates are eligible for office, and voters may evaluate such arguments.  
When Hillary Clinton supporters raised challenges to Barack Obama’s 
eligibility in 200813 or when Donald Trump openly questioned Ted Cruz’s 
eligibility in 2016,14 voters could evaluate the claims as a part of their 
decision-making process.  It is the first of two opportunities for voters—the 
second being the general election.15 
B.  Political Parties and Convention Delegates 
The parties themselves can stipulate as to whether their candidates meet 
the qualifications needed to be their presidential and vice-presidential 
nominees.16  They may deny the party’s nomination to ineligible 
candidates.17  The Republican National Convention’s decision in 2016 to 
count 484 delegates’ votes cast for Ted Cruz, for instance, may well reflect 
the party’s view that Cruz is constitutionally eligible.18  Additionally, while 
the parties typically constrain delegates to vote for the candidates they were 
pledged to support, delegates who are not pledged to a candidate (perhaps 
after a round of voting at the convention) are also free to consider the 
purported eligibility of candidates, much as voters do. 
C.  General-Election Voters 
General-election voters are not required to behave in a particular fashion 
in their decision-making process, and they are free to consider a wide range 
 
 13. See Ben Smith & Byron Tau, Birtherism:  Where It All Began, POLITICO, http:// 
www.politico.com/news/stories/0411/53563.html (last updated Apr. 24, 2011, 5:33 PM) 
[https://perma.cc/5B6C-36KR]. 
 14. Todd J. Gillman, Trump Questions Cruz Eligibility, and Canada-Born Senator Says 
Rival Has ‘Jumped the Shark,’ DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 5, 2016), http:// 
trailblazersblog.dallasnews.com/2016/01/trump-questions-cruz-eligibility-canada-born-
senator-says-rival-has-jumped-the-shark.html/ [https://perma.cc/SK2V-ZZ5Q]. 
 15. See infra Part I.C. 
 16. Cf. Chad Flanders, What Do We Want in a Presidential Primary—An Election Law 
Perspective, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 901, 922 (2011). 
 17. Cf. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION MATERIALS FOR THE 2016 
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION r. 12(K) (2014), http://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/ 
files/12.15.14_2016_Delegate_Selection_Documents_Mailing_-_Rules_Call_Regs_Model_ 
Plan_Checklist_12.15.14.pdf (describing criteria for the Democratic presidential candidates 
“in addition to the requirements set forth by the United States Constitution”) 
[https://perma.cc/NZ5A-TTWJ]; REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY r. 16(d)(5) (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-static-ngop-pbl/docs/Rules_of_ 
the_Republican+Party_FINAL_S14090314.pdf (prohibiting state laws that “hinder[], 
abridge[], or den[y]” the right of constitutionally eligible candidates from being candidates) 
[https://perma.cc/K7VY-9ERC]. 
 18. Admittedly, in this particular case, the Republican National Convention rules do not 
formally require candidates to be eligible, and no one formally objected to Cruz’s 
nomination. 
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of factors.  One of those factors may well be a candidate’s constitutional 
ineligibility—actual or perceived.19 
D.  Presidential Electors 
Presidential electors theoretically exercise independent judgment in 
casting votes for the President and Vice President, and they could reject 
candidates they found to be ineligible.  Practically, few electors today 
exercise such independent judgment and almost uniformly cast votes 
consistent with the candidate they are pledged to support.  Some states also 
compel electors to take an oath to support their pledged candidate; a few 
make it a crime to be a faithless elector or, alternatively, refuse to count 
their votes.20 
But electors have historically had the power to exercise independent 
judgment in voting.  That role is particularly significant when the candidate 
has passed away before the electors meet.  In 1912, for instance, eight 
electors who pledged to support William Howard Taft cast vice-presidential 
votes for Nicholas Butler after Taft’s Vice President, James Sherman, died 
just days before the election.21  And in 1872, electors scattered their votes 
for presidential candidates after Horace Greeley died between Election Day 
and the meeting of the Electoral College.22  They were not simply 
exercising independent judgment about whether these candidates deserved 
their votes.  Presumably, they were also scrutinizing the qualifications of 
candidates and concluded that dead men were ineligible for executive 
office. 
E.  Congress 
While Congress’s power to judge the qualifications, elections, and 
returns of its own members is well established,23 its power in presidential 
election is less certain.  Congress is given the power to count the electoral 
votes cast for President and Vice President.24  A robust debate in 1800 left 
open the question whether Congress had the power to independently 
 
 19. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 63, 94 (1990); see also Muller, supra note 7, at 579–80 & nn.152–53. 
 20. See Muller, supra note 7, at 571–72. 
 21. See Joshua Spivak, Could Trump Drop Out?, USA TODAY (Aug. 9, 2016, 5:47 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/08/09/trump-drop-out-race-ballot-republicans-
ryan-delegates-november-column/88450076/ [https://perma.cc/CK7D-5L5H]; see also 
Historical Election Results:  Electoral College Box Scores 1789–1996, NAT’L ARCHIVES & 
RECORDS ADMIN.:  U.S. ELECTORAL C., https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-
college/scores.html#1912 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/Q24U-GUPX]. 
 22. See Muller, supra note 7, at 586–87. 
 23. See, e.g., Lisa Marshall Manheim, Judging Congressional Elections, 51 GA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2017); see also Joshua A.  Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 
88 IND. L.J. 1, 24–29 (2013) (describing statutes promulgated by Congress designed to 
resolve election congressional disputes). See generally Franita Tolson, What Is Abridgment?:  
A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433 (2015) (describing Congress’s power 
to reduce a state’s delegation in the House of Representatives if the state abridges the right to 
vote). 
 24. See Muller, supra note 7, at 585. 
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evaluate whether the candidates were eligible for office or whether its task 
counting electoral votes was simply ministerial.25  In 1873, however, the 
House refused to count three electoral votes cast for the deceased Horace 
Greeley—an exercise of its independent discretion to review the 
qualifications of candidates.26 
F.  State-Level Implications 
These opportunities to resolve questions about a candidate’s eligibility 
ought to give states some pause.  Should states be in the business of 
scrutinizing whether candidates are eligible for office, or should they 
simply accept the paperwork of candidates as a ministerial task and let the 
electoral process play out?  Given other opportunities to settle the question 
in the political process, what role, if any, should courts play in this 
decision-making process? 
States have no constitutional duty to scrutinize the qualifications of 
federal candidates.27  And states might simply be reluctant to empower 
these officials; after all, there are ample opportunities to moot these 
disputes.  Indeed, consider that Cruz failed to secure the Republican 
nomination. 
But states also may have a desire to ensure that their voters are not 
wasting their votes on ineligible candidates at any stage of the process.  
State legislatures have the authority to empower election officials or state 
courts with the power to resolve such disputes.28  In the event they choose 
to do so, what should such scrutiny look like? 
Despite the protracted, often frivolous litigation surrounding presidential 
candidates in 2008 and 2012, most states did nothing—paving the way for 
potential litigation surrounding the next candidate whose eligibility was at 
all in question.  Most of the litigation surrounding Obama turned on 
findings of fact—usually, was he born in Hawaii, or was he secretly born in 
Indonesia?  Perhaps, then, states were reluctant to seriously address how 
such disputes should be resolved given the frivolity of the claims.  
Challenges29 surrounding Cruz, however, turned on conclusions of law 
(similar to McCain).  The facts around Cruz were not in dispute—he was 
born to a Cuban father and an American mother in Canada.  That left the 
potential for more serious complications when election officials or courts 
face these disputes. 
 
 25. See id. at 585–86. 
 26. See id. at 586–88. 
 27. See id. at 601 n.341. 
 28. See id. at 561. 
 29. The word “challenges” is deliberately broad.  It is used here to refer to any formal 
challenges to a candidate’s eligibility, whether a hearing before an administrative tribunal, a 
petition to an election official, or a lawsuit filed in court. 
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II.  JURISDICTIONAL SCOPE OF ELECTION BOARDS 
AND STATE COURTS 
The first question confronting election officials or state courts in 
resolving natural born citizen challenges raised during this election was 
whether the arbiters even had the jurisdiction to hear such challenges to a 
candidate’s eligibility.  State legislatures define the power of administrative 
officials and state courts.  These tribunals might construe their jurisdiction 
narrowly and refuse to hear such disputes absent a rather express directive 
from the legislature.  But most found jurisdiction rather easily, sometimes 
despite plain language to the contrary.30 
A.  Illinois 
Illinois law requires that presidential candidates sign a statement of 
candidacy that one is “qualified for the office.”31  The electoral board has 
the power to review objections to the petition—whether they are in “proper 
form,” “within the time and under the conditions required by law,” 
“genuine,” and “valid.”32  Put another way, in Illinois, the “scope of inquiry 
with respect to objections to nomination papers is limited to ascertaining 
whether those papers comply with the provisions of the Election Code 
governing such papers.”33  Other provisions of the Elections Code describe 
the eligibility of candidates for state office.34  There is no question in 
Illinois that the board has the power to scrutinize qualifications for state 
office enunciated elsewhere in state law.35 
But did the board have the power to decide whether a candidate for 
President is a natural born citizen or otherwise meets provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution?  Yes, the board concluded; it had jurisdiction to hear such 
challenges, including over whether Cruz was a natural born citizen.36  And 
it went on to conclude that “Ted Cruz became a natural born citizen at the 
moment of his birth” because his mother “was a U.S. citizen.”37 
B.  Indiana 
The Indiana Election Commission is empowered to administer Indiana 
election laws.38  Indiana law dictates that presidential candidates must meet 
 
 30. The jurisdictions discussed in this part are those that had any meaningful assessment 
of the scope of their jurisdiction or the appropriate authority to engage in eligibility 
determinations.  Other jurisdictions also considered such challenges but dismissed them on 
other grounds, like standing, without reaching these issues, or they summarily dismissed the 
claims without meaningful analysis. 
 31. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-5(3) (2016). 
 32. Id. at 5/10-10. 
 33. Bryant v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 865 N.E. 2d 189, 192 (Ill. 2007). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Joyce v. Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 526 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham 
v. Cruz, 16 SOEB GP 527 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016); Graham v. Rubio, 16 
SOEB GP 528 (Ill. State Bd. of Elections Jan. 28, 2016). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See IND. CODE ANN. § 3-6-4.1-14 (2016). 
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the qualifications set forth in the U.S. Constitution,39 and the commission 
may hear questions about the validity of candidacies.40  Candidates in 
presidential primaries sign a request to appear on the ballot and include 
petitions signed by voters.41  But, unlike candidates for other federal or 
state offices governed by a different chapter, there is ostensibly no 
requirement that the candidate even certify that he is eligible for office or 
that he complies with the qualifications in Indiana state law.42 
Parties filed petitions seeking to exclude Marco Rubio’s and Cruz’s 
names from the ballot, challenging their eligibility before the commission.  
During a hearing over Rubio’s eligibility, one member of the commission 
thought that a question of subject matter jurisdiction “was the most direct 
point and the more basic argument.”43  Another commissioner was more 
uncertain about the question of jurisdiction.44  The commission then 
entertained a motion that the challenge “be denied,” without clarification as 
to whether it was a lack of jurisdiction or a finding on the merits, and the 
motion was unanimously approved.45 
An attorney representing Cruz claimed that the question was beyond the 
jurisdiction of the commission and “lies solely before the U.S. Congress.”46  
The commission again entertained a motion that “both petitions be denied,” 
without clarification.47  After some extended discussion on the merits, the 
commission denied the motion by a 3–1 vote.48 
C.  New Hampshire 
New Hampshire law also requires candidates to sign a declaration under 
penalty of perjury that they are “qualified to be a candidate for president of 
the United States pursuant to . . . the United States Constitution, which 
states, ‘No person except a natural born citizen . . . shall be eligible to the 
office of the President . . . .’”49  The secretary of state reviews the 
declarations for “regularity,” and such decisions “shall be final.”50  The 
state’s Ballot Law Commission (BLC), however, is empowered to “hear 
and determine disputes arising over whether nomination papers or 
declarations of candidacy filed with the secretary of state conform with the 
law.”51 
 
 39. See id. § 3-8-1-6(a). 
 40. See id. § 3-8-2-14. 
 41. See id. § 3-8-3-2. 
 42. See id. § 3-8-2-7(a)(5). 
 43. Transcript of Proceeding at 23, Challenge to Marco Rubio, Cause No. 2016-2 (Ind. 
Election Comm’n Feb. 19, 2016), https://secure.in.gov/sos/elections/files/IEC_Minutes_ 
Feb_19_2016_Part_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5RL-26P4]. 
 44. See id. at 25. 
 45. Id. at 26–28. 
 46. Id. at 34. 
 47. Id. at 43. 
 48. Id. at 49. 
 49. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 655:47(I) (2016). 
 50. Id. § 655:47(III). 
 51. Id. § 665:7. 
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The BLC determined it has the power to hear disputes over whether a 
candidate is a natural born citizen.  It distinguished the power over 
“regularity,” which resided with the secretary of state, from whether the 
petitions “conform with the law,” a task for the BLC.52  Conformity with 
law, it reasoned, included the power to review the presidential candidates’ 
qualifications. 
In a challenge to Cruz’s eligibility, however, it offered an unusually 
deferential standard of legal review.  “Absent an obvious defect in a filing,” 
the BLC explained, it would approve the reasonableness of the secretary of 
state’s decision.53  “Clearly, there is no final decision on the meaning of 
‘natural born citizen,’ and this Commission is not the appropriate forum for 
the determination of major Constitutional questions.”54  The BLC likewise 
found that there was no “obvious defect” in Cruz’s declaration.55 
D.  New Jersey 
New Jersey law requires that petitions for candidacy include the 
candidate’s name, residence, and office sought.56  It does not require a 
certification that the candidate is eligible for office.57  Candidates must 
submit petitions with sufficient signatures to appear on the ballot.  Petitions 
“in apparent conformity” with the law are “deemed to be valid” unless an 
objection is filed.58  If an objection is filed, the secretary of state “shall in 
the first instance pass upon the validity of such objection” to a petition.59 
A New Jersey administrative law judge accepted that the secretary of 
state “is obliged to rule” on a question of Cruz’s eligibility.60  And the 
secretary of state embraced this conclusion.  There was no scrutiny of the 
jurisdictional basis for doing so; jurisdiction was assumed.  After all, a 
petition’s validity means that it conforms with state law—that it includes 
the proper number of valid signatures, that it was filed on time, and so on.  
Nothing in state law requires candidates to certify that they meet the 
qualifications enumerated in the Constitution.  Indeed, it is a reason an 
avowedly unqualified candidate like Nicaraguan citizen Róger Calero 
appeared on the New Jersey ballot in 2004 and 2008 as the presidential 
candidate for the Socialist Workers Party.61  And while state law does 
 
 52. Elliot v. Cruz, BLC 2015-2 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015); see also Laity v. Cruz, 
BLC 2015-4 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015). 
 53. Elliot, BLC 2015-2; see also Laity, BLC 2015-4 (rejecting a challenge to Marco 
Rubio’s candidacy for identical reasons). 
 54. Elliot, BLC 2015-2; see also Laity, BLC 2015-4. 
 55. Elliot, BLC 2015-2; see also Laity, BLC 2015-4. 
 56. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:13-4 (West 2016). 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. § 19:13-10. 
 59. Id. § 19:13-11. 
 60. Williams v. Cruz (Williams I), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op. at 4 
(N.J. Office of Admin. Law Apr. 12, 2016) (initial decision by administrative law judge). 
 61. See FEC, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2004:  ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, 
THE U.S. SENATE AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 27–39 (2005), http:// 
www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Z2G-F67L]; FEC, 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2008:  ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE 
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permit an election contest on the basis that the incumbent was not “eligible 
to the office,” that is only triggered “at the time of the election.”62  New 
Jersey’s statute looks to be quite deferential to the political process and 
would not permit judicial and administrative review of presidential 
candidates.  But an administrative law judge, and the secretary of state, 
construed the statute broadly to assert jurisdiction.63 
E.  New York 
An outlier among these challenges came from New York.  The New 
York State Board of Elections was aware of legal challenges surrounding 
Cruz when it agreed to permit his name to appear on the ballot.64  During 
discussions about this litigation, one board member indicated that the “goal 
is not for us to get involved in the substance,” with another affirming, “[w]e 
have limited jurisdiction.”65  They allowed the judiciary to handle the 
dispute.  And in that dispute, the courts did not need to address the 
jurisdictional question after they concluded the petitions were untimely.66 
F.  Florida 
Challenges to Rubio’s and Cruz’s eligibility were filed in Florida state 
court.67  In a somewhat complicated procedural posture, the plaintiff sued 
Rubio, Cruz, and the Florida secretary of state.  The plaintiff then 
voluntarily dismissed the claim against the secretary of state.  When the 
court considered Rubio’s and Cruz’s motions to dismiss, it issued a three-
part ruling:  the voluntary dismissal of the secretary of state was fatal to the 
rest of the case; the plaintiff lacked standing; and even if the plaintiff had 
standing, the plaintiff’s “substantive arguments reside in the hands of the 
United States Congress.”68  While it might have been better to cite the lack 
of jurisdictional authority in Florida rather than a bare recital of Congress’s 
authority, it reflected another court deferring to the existing dispute 
resolution mechanisms rather than assume authority existed. 
 
AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 27–40 (2009), http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2008/ 
federalelections2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/36HH-F7KJ]. 
 62. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-1(b). 
 63. See Williams I, OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op at 25; see also 
Williams v. Cruz (Williams II), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16 (N.J. Office of 
Admin. Law Apr. 13, 2016) (final decision by Secretary of State adopting administrative law 
judge’s findings). 
 64. See generally N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, Commissioners Meeting Transcript (Feb. 
23, 2016), http://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/News/MeetingMinutes/CCTranscriptions 
02232016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KPX-TNTF]. 
 65. Id. at 10. 
 66. See Korman v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 522647 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 24, 
2016), appeal denied, No. 2016-374 (N.Y. Apr. 1, 2016). 
 67. See, e.g., Voeltz v. Cruz, No. 15-022044(02) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2016). 
 68. Id. 
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G.  Reflections on Jurisdiction 
In a nation of fifty states, it is hardly surprising to see great diversity in 
how states administer presidential elections and presidential preference 
primaries.69  The Constitution leaves to the discretion of each state 
legislature to decide the manner in which such elections take place.70  Some 
have given election boards and state courts some power to review 
qualifications (or, at least, have been interpreted to do so); others have not.  
But in instances where decision makers do assert the authority to hear such 
challenges, they can encounter difficulties assessing the law that governs 
these disputes. 
III.  ERRORS OF LAW 
Most election boards and state courts concluded, expressly or implicitly, 
that they had authority to hear challenges to Cruz’s eligibility.  They 
frequently dismissed such challenges on other grounds, for example, 
because the challenge was filed in an untimely fashion71 or the plaintiff 
lacked standing to raise the challenge.72  But some courts also made 
erroneous statements of constitutional law concerning the Electoral College 
and Congress. 
A.  New Jersey 
A New Jersey administrative law judge focused on whether a dispute 
over Cruz’s eligibility was a political question, reserved to a branch of 
government other than the judiciary.73  Most simplistically, the political 
question doctrine asks whether the Constitution forbids a court to answer 
certain questions of law because the resolution of those issues has been 
committed to another branch of government.  For example, one such 
question concerns whether the power to review is a textually demonstrable 
commitment to another branch of government.74  But there are times where 
other branches may still examine questions of law and courts may 
independently examine the same questions.75 
In New Jersey, the judge provided an inaccurate statement of law when 
he confused the political question doctrine with state jurisdiction: 
 
 69. See generally Derek T. Muller, Invisible Federalism and the Electoral College, 44 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1237 (2012). 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 71. See, e.g., Korman, No. 522647 (discussing the lower court’s dismissal for 
untimeliness of the claim). 
 72. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Cruz, No. H-16-106, 2016 WL 1449251, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 
13, 2016); Wagner v. Cruz, No. 2:16-cv-55-JNP (D. Utah Mar. 18, 2016). 
 73. See Williams v. Cruz (Williams I), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op. at 
3–4 (N.J. Office of Admin. Law Apr. 12, 2016). 
 74. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); see also Tara Leigh Grove, 
The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1914 (2015); 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Questions Doctrine, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment:  A Reply to Professors Kent and Shane, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 603, 607 (2001). 
 75. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
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The Electoral College is not vested with the power to determine the 
eligibility of the Presidential candidate since it is only charged to select 
the candidate for each office and transmit its votes to the “seat of 
government.”  Congress has no power over this process . . . except where 
a tie vote occurs . . . .  Congress is not afforded [a] role in connection with 
the issue of Presidential eligibility.  There is no basis to conclude that the 
issue of eligibility of a person to serve as President has been textually 
committed to Congress or the Electoral College.76 
The last sentence does not follow from the previous several, which are 
incorrect as a matter of law.  Both the Electoral College and Congress have 
the power to review the qualifications of candidates.  The election of 1872 
is the paradigmatic example, as noted earlier.77  Horace Greeley died after 
Election Day but before the Electoral College met.78  Most electors cast 
their votes for someone else—presumably because they believed that 
Greeley was no longer eligible to serve as President.79  And when Congress 
was confronted with three electoral votes for the deceased Greeley, it 
refused to count them—again, presumably because it believed that he was 
no longer eligible to serve as President.80  Both bodies adjudicated the 
qualifications of presidential candidates.81 
So the Electoral College and Congress may review qualifications of 
presidential candidates.  But it is another thing entirely to say that these 
bodies possess the sole authority to do so, to the exclusion of the judicial 
branch.  The political question doctrine, as articulated by the Supreme 
Court, involves a “textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department.”82  That means a commitment to another 
branch in such a way that the judiciary cannot interfere.  State legislatures 
are permitted to empower state courts or state election officials to review 
qualifications.83  They may choose not to do so, but they could task review 
to the courts if they so desired.  The New Jersey administrative law judge, 
however, apparently worried that ceding any authority to review 
qualifications might deprive his court of the ability to review them.  And he 
decided to deny the Electoral College and Congress any role whatsoever, a 
clear error.  The secretary of state adopted the reasoning of the 
administrative law judge in its entirety, errors and all.84 
B.  Pennsylvania 
A state judge in Pennsylvania committed a similar error as the New 
Jersey court:  “[T]he Constitution does not vest the Electoral College with 
 
 76. Williams I, OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16, slip op at 4–5. 
 77. See supra Part I. 
 78. See Muller, supra note 7, at 586–87. 
 79. See id. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 83. See supra Part II. 
 84. See Williams v. Cruz (Williams II), OAL Nos. STE 5016-16, STE 5018-16 (N.J. 
Office of Admin. Law Apr. 13, 2016). 
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power to determine the eligibility of a Presidential candidate since it only 
charges the embers [sic] of the Electoral College to select a candidate for 
President and then transmit their votes to the nation’s ‘seat of 
government.’”85  But what does the power to “select” mean if it does not 
include the discretion to decide whether someone is fit for office—
including, perhaps, whether someone is eligible for office? 
The judge went on to find that Congress also lacked such power:  “[N]o 
Constitutional provision places such power in Congress to determine 
Presidential eligibility.  Moreover, other than setting forth the bare 
argument, the Candidate offers no further support for the contrary 
proposition.”86  Perhaps a failure to adequately brief the court in the haste 
of resolving a time-sensitive ballot access dispute led to this finding.  But 
Congress’s refusal in 1873 to count electoral votes cast for the deceased 
Greeley suggests that power does in fact reside in Congress to determine 
presidential eligibility, as rarely as that power might have been used.87  
Indeed, the Senate’s proclamation in 2008 that John McCain was a natural 
born citizen suggests that Congress, to this day, believes it has the power to 
review the qualifications of presidential candidates.88 
C.  Reflections on Errors of Law 
Perhaps these judges have some excuse for their errors.  The period of 
time between the opening briefs to the final decision was sometimes a 
matter of days, typical of short-fuse litigation in challenges to candidates’ 
petitions for ballot access.  The formal role of the Electoral College and of 
Congress in presidential elections is rarely considered in contemporary 
legal disputes.  While the parties and press often emphasized the merits of 
the natural born citizen dispute, perhaps less attention may have been given 
to these more rote procedural matters.  But by asserting jurisdiction to hear 
these claims, the courts set themselves up for erroneous statements of law. 
Appellate tribunals were far more cautious.  They mostly summarily 
affirmed or affirmed without comment as to the basis of the finding.  In 
Pennsylvania, for instance, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the 
order dismissing the case without explanation.89  But these lingering 
judicial precedents make future litigation all the more complicated.  Eager 
plaintiffs now have multiple sources of inaccurate law to cite in furtherance 
of their claims.  Perhaps the risk of erroneous statements of law is a major 
reason that many election tribunals expressly desired clarity and certainty in 
the form of an opinion from the Supreme Court. 
 
 85. Elliot v. Cruz, 137 A.3d 646, 650–51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 134 A.3d 51 
(Pa. 2016), cert. denied, No. 16-13, 2016 WL 3570607 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2016). 
 86. Id. at 651. 
 87. See supra notes 26, 80 and accompanying text. 
 88. See S. Res. 511, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (resolving unanimously that Senator 
McCain is a natural born citizen); see also Muller, supra note 7, at 587–89. 
 89. See Elliot, 134 A.3d at 51. 
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IV.  A DESIRE FOR CERTAINTY AND JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
When election administrators heard these eligibility challenges, they 
often asserted jurisdiction.90  But they also frequently expressed reluctance 
that they should be the ones who handled such disputes.  They preferred 
that a court—perhaps a federal court, or the Supreme Court—would hear 
the challenge.  For example, a commissioner in New York lamented, 
“[T]his type of heavy decision should really be made in a federal court.”91  
Another chimed in, “I agree with you that it’s an important issue that ought 
to be resolved in the courts.”92  An Indiana commissioner complained, “I 
wish that there was a way that we could transfer this directly to the 
Supreme Court and let them rule.”93  After permitting Cruz to appear on the 
ballot, the New Hampshire BLC concluded parenthetically:  “[T]he 
appropriate raising in and deciding of this question by a court equipped to 
decide such Constitutional matters, so that all election officials and the 
American people know once and for all the definition of ‘natural born 
citizen,’ would be helpful in avoiding uncertainty.”94 
The election officials seemed to be at a loss in deciding how to handle the 
uncertainty before them.  The term “natural born citizen” remained the 
subject of some dispute.  An Indiana commissioner thought that they should 
err on the side of permitting the candidate on the ballot.95  The New 
Hampshire BLC concluded that Cruz’s petition did not contain an 
“obvious” defect.96  These are hardly sure statements of Cruz’s eligibility.  
It is something of a curiosity, then, that these agencies would so easily find 
jurisdiction and yet so desire to delegate the actual jurisdiction to another 
court—rather than leaving the matter to the voters, Electoral College, or 
Congress.  It is a sign that executive and state judicial actors are 
uncomfortable with nonjudicial resolution of constitutional claims like 
these.  That discomfort perhaps counsels against state legislatures 
empowering them to make such decisions.  It is not obvious, however, that 
judicial intervention, even from the Supreme Court, would offer the best 
solution. 
V.  AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
Solutions to this litigation are not simple.  The jurisdictional and 
procedural issues continue to entangle election officials and state courts in 
vexatious challenges.  Presidential elections are operated by the states, 
which leaves discretion to fifty separate jurisdictions to handle such 
disputes and will create a patchwork of solutions under the existing regime 
(assuming individual states decide to seek solutions, a doubtful proposition 
 
 90. See supra Part II. 
 91. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, supra note 64, at 10. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 43, at 47. 
 94. Elliot v. Cruz, BLC 2015-2 (N.H. Ballot Law Comm’n 2015). 
 95. Transcript of Proceeding, supra note 43, at 46. 
 96. Elliot, BLC 2015-2. 
2016] “NATURAL BORN” DISPUTES 1111 
given the repetition of issues in 2016 that first arose in 2008 and 2012).  A 
small, but complicated, solution does exist:  amending the Constitution. 
A constitutional amendment concerning natural born citizens is nothing 
new.  The most recent serious attempt to abolish the natural born citizen 
requirement arose from a proposal promulgated by Senator Orrin Hatch in 
2003.  The “Equal Opportunity to Govern” amendment would have 
changed the natural born citizen requirement to a qualification that a 
candidate be “20 years a citizen of the United States.”97  Such an 
amendment was ostensibly targeted to permit obviously disqualified 
candidates, like Austria-born former California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, an opportunity to run for President.98 
The justifications for this clause appear to have fallen away in our 
contemporary society.  The Framers were likely worried that a foreign 
monarch might swoop in and seize control of the fledgling republic.99  Even 
assuming that the challengers to recent presidential candidates’ eligibility 
are correct in their definition of “natural born citizen,” there is no serious 
concern that Obama, McCain, or Cruz would turn America over to a foreign 
sovereign.  A twenty-year citizenship requirement seems reasonably 
sufficient to protect against concerns of foreign incursion into the executive 
branch. 
Admittedly, some may believe that a twenty-year citizenship period is 
insufficient and would prefer a thirty-year, or even longer, citizenship 
period, perhaps coupled with a lengthy domestic residency requirement.  
Matters of such policy would surely generate robust debate but all toward 
the common end of providing greater clarity in our constitutional 
qualifications for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. 
If we need not fear longstanding citizens serving as President, then we 
can help courts avoid these many challenges for generations to come.  
Despite some academic scholarship offering concrete understandings of the 
phrase, the administrative and judicial uncertainty surrounding the phrase 
“natural born citizen” is a valuable basis for passing the amendment.100  It 
would have prevented all these lawsuits concerning the eligibility of 
presidential candidates.  It would have moved political and legal resources 
toward more meaningful endeavors. 
Amending the Constitution is, I concede, no easy solution.  But three 
consecutive presidential election cycles have yielded major challenges to an 
understanding of “natural born citizen.”  A fourth cycle with such 
challenges seems inevitable.101  But the last eight years have demonstrated 
 
 97. S.J. Res. 15, 108th Cong. (2003).  
 98. See Martin Kasindorf, Should the Constitution Be Amended for Arnold?, USA 
TODAY (Dec. 3, 2016, 8:54 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/ 
2004-12-02-schwarzenegger-amendment_x.htm [https://perma.cc/22WK-Z7KZ]. 
 99. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 164–66 (2005). 
 100. See, e.g., Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA:  
The Striking Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential 
Qualifications Clause and Why We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53 (2005). 
 101. See Tim Alberta, Ted Cruz Isn’t Changing a Thing, NAT’L REV. (July 20, 2016, 
10:21 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438144/interview-ted-cruz-2016-
1112 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
that the states lack an adequate procedural mechanism for reviewing the 
Natural Born Citizen Clause, particularly in instances where its 
understanding is a matter of some dispute.  Their inability to do so counsels 
in favor of a federal, and more lasting, solution. 
 
 
strategy-and-2020-plans (“There is no question Cruz will run for president again. . . .  [H]is 
2020 plans are likely to move forward no matter who wins the White House this fall . . . .”) 
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